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T
he advantage of mutual help is
threatened by defectors, who
exploit the benefits provided by
others without providing bene-
fits in return. Cooperation can only be
sustained if it is preferentially channeled
toward cooperators and away from de-
fectors. But how? A deceptively simple
idea is to distinguish cooperators from
defectors by tagging them. It clearly is
in the interest of cooperators to use
some distinctive cue to assort with their
like. Such an assortment, however, con-
flicts with the interests of the cheaters,
who have every incentive to also acquire
that tag. This makes for an inherently
unstable situation. The history of evolu-
tionary thinking on this issue is long. An
article in this issue of PNAS by Antal et
al. (1) opens new ground by providing
an in-depth analysis of a selection-
mutation model.
The first to investigate a tag for altru-
ism was W. D. Hamilton (2). He con-
ceived what he called a supergene, able
to produce (i) a distinctive phenotypic
trait, (ii) the faculty to recognize the
trait in others, and (iii) the propensity to
direct benefits toward bearers of that
trait, even though this entails a fitness
cost. Soon afterward, Richard Dawkins
described Hamilton’s thought experi-
ment by using as phenotypic trait the
fanciful example of a green beard. The
supergene was now termed ‘‘green
beard gene,’’ in part to acknowledge its
inherent unlikelihood. ‘‘Too good to be
true,’’ were Dawkins’ words (3): for the
gene would have to be able to program
for 3 effects, namely the feature, its rec-
ognition, and the altruistic propensity.
The green-beard concept relates to
both major approaches to cooperation
in evolutionary biology, namely kin se-
lection (2) and reciprocal altruism (4). It
helps in promoting assortment between
cooperators; as a result, cooperators can
get more than they give, so that altruism
becomes a thriving business. Because
wearers of green beards both confer and
receive benefits, the tag works as a kind
of promise that the altruistic action will
be returned, not necessarily by the re-
cipient, but by another member of the
green-bearded guild. In this sense, the
green beard mediates an indirect form
of reciprocation, through third parties.
In the usual models of indirect reciproc-
ity, ‘‘good guys’’ are recognized by their
reputation, which is based on their past
deeds (5). Here, however, recognition is
ensured by a phenotypic trait, which is a
less sophisticated (and possibly less reli-
able) signal.
Mostly, the green beard is studied in
the context of kin selection. If you carry
a green beard, your relatives are likely
to carry one, too. Directing benefits at
green-bearded individuals confers the
benefits preferentially to your kin and
raises your indirect fitness (because your
kin shares your genes with a higher-
than-average probability). In many
cases, kin are living close by. But the
viscosity of the population (to use an-
other term by Hamilton) is not enough
to guarantee a local increase in coopera-
tion, because it is counterbalanced by a
local increase in competition. Limited
dispersal alone is therefore not enough.
A gene for kin recognition can help to
direct positive rather than negative ef-
fects toward relatives. But it is impor-
tant to realize that the green beard can
promote altruism beyond the realm of
the family.
Some 10 years ago, it was found that
green beards are not as implausible as
their name suggests. In particular, Haig
(6) remarked that genes for homophilic
cell adhesion could perform all 3 tasks
required from a green-beard gene (trait,
recognition, and action) by coding for a
surface protein that allows them to stick
to copies of themselves on other cells. A
few years later, it was found that csA
genes in Dictyostelium discoideum fit the
bill (7). In hard times, these amoeba
literally stick together to form stalks for
dispersing their spores. A similar gene
has also been discovered in flocculating
yeast cells (8). Other candidates for
more sophisticated green-beard effects
have been found in ants and lizards.
An obvious way to cheat is to grow a
green beard but skip the altruism. For
homophilic cell adhesion, this seems
barely feasible. In other examples,
cheating may be prevented by genetic
constraints. But in principle, one would
expect that a tight link between a gene
for altruistic behavior and a gene for tag
recognition will ultimately be broken,
and cooperation be destroyed. Surpris-
ingly, it turned out that if the link is not
too tight (but not too loose either), a
dynamic regime of cooperation can
emerge, based on tag diversity. When-
ever some tag becomes too frequent, it
can be faked by defectors, but coopera-
tive behavior subsists nevertheless, by
allying itself with another tag. This phe-
nomenon has been termed ‘‘beard chro-
modynamics,’’ to suggest that green
beards can over time be replaced by red,
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Fig. 1. Face transitions. Players in a game theoretic experiment are provided with pictures of their
partnerswho, throughdigital sorcery, aremade to look like themselves, to agreater or lesser extent. Here,
the face in themiddle is the result of a 60:40mix of the other 2 faces. Players preferentially trust coplayers
who lookmore like themselves. Thus, familiarity enhances trust. With permission from Lisa DeBruine, see
ref. 14.
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or blue, or yellow beards as rallying sig-
nals for cooperators (9, 10).
The underlying principle is that of a
shibboleth, or secret handshake. But
such a specially-contrived trait, evolved
for the purpose of signaling cooperation,
is not always necessary.
Tag-based cooperation can also rely
on self-similarity. All that is needed is
some general means to recognize what
is like yourself and what is not, i.e., to
distinguish ‘‘us’’ from ‘‘them.’’
With familiars, you need no badge, or
password. This has been called the
‘‘armpit effect’’ (by Dawkins see ref. 3).
Although an obvious variation of the
green-beard principle could mediate, in
principle, symbiosis between 2 different
species, the armpit effect is self-referen-
tial. You need not sprout a special rec-
ognition device but simply check
whether the other looks, smells, or
sounds like you.
Mechanisms based on self-similarity
are commonly used among cells of an
organism or among members of a spe-
cies. Kin recognition seems widespread:
it is useful, not only for promoting nep-
otism, but also for avoiding incest (11).
Bats or birds recognize their offspring
on crowded cave roofs and cliff faces
through vocalizations; hamsters and
wasps pick up the odor of their nest or
colony, etc. Interestingly, these faculties
seem always acquired through imprint-
ing, rather than genetically encoded.
Thus, they indicate in-group rather than
kin. This use of associative learning is
well supported by theory (12).
An armpit effect has been recently
found in hamsters (13). Self-similarity
appears to work in humans, too: we like
our like. Neat economic experiments
show that players preferentially trust
similar-looking coplayers (14) (Fig. 1).
(The players are provided with pictures
of their ostensible partners, and these
photos are manipulated to look to a
greater or lesser degree like them-
selves). Clearly, such cues for self-simi-
larity can be enhanced by cultural
means. Many groups provide their mem-
bers with characteristic uniforms,
badges, tattoos, ties, haircuts, hangouts,
accents, musical tastes, or slang idioms.
In most tag-based models, the tags
are discrete; you either look like me or
you do not. In general, defectors can be
overcome only for a restricted range of
recombination between tag and behav-
ior (cf. refs. 15–17). However, similarity
is likely to be a question of degree; you
can look more or less like me. In the
case of continuous graduation, it is
likely that cooperative behavior is ad-
dressed toward all those who are tolera-
bly similar.
Such models show intriguing patterns:
cliques of similar cooperators grow, are
beset and undermined by defectors, and
regroup around other phenotypes (18,
19). Extending tolerance to a larger
range of tag values enlarges the basis of
collaboration, whereas restricting toler-
ance shields from exploiters: this leads
to endlessly f luctuating ‘‘tides of
tolerance’’ (20).
In the model of Antal et al. (1), mem-
bers of a well-mixed population of con-
stant size N are distinguished by a tag
that can take infinitely many values and
is coded by integers.
Defectors help nobody, and coopera-
tors provide help exclusively to members
of their own tag group. From time to
time, individuals produce offspring in
numbers proportional to their fitness.
Some N of these offspring are randomly
chosen to form the next generation. Off-
spring inherit from their parent both
their behavior (cooperator or defector)
and their tag, up to mutation. Each con-
figuration of the population is specified
by the number of defectors and cooper-
ators for each tag. The expected payoff
values for defectors and cooperators can
easily be computed in terms of condi-
tional probabilities (e.g., for defectors to
interact with cooperators, etc.). This
specifies the configurations for which
cooperators are sufficiently assorted
with other cooperators to earn more
than defectors do. But the configura-
tions move and cluster in a very fluid
manner through the range of possible
tags. It needs considerable mathematical
dexterity to average the payoffs over all
configurations in the stationary state.
This yields, under the limiting assump-
tion of weak selection, a condition for
cooperators to be more frequent than
defectors in the long term, requiring
that the benefit-to-cost ratio exceeds a
specific threshold. Under the most fa-
vorable conditions, i.e., when mutations
between tags are frequent and muta-
tions in the behavior rare, that threshold
is slightly larger than 2. In contrast to
previous models (9, 15, 16), no addi-
tional requirements on spatial popula-
tion distribution are used. The analysis
of several limiting cases shows that the
results depend significantly on mutation
structure, about which empirical data
are lacking at present. The elusive na-
ture of the game of hide and seek be-
tween cooperators and defectors, an
age-long spur for biological and cultural
evolution, continues to challenge experi-
mentalists and theoreticians alike.
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Economic experiments
show that players
preferentially trust
similar-looking
coplayers.
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